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We provide the first test of the Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) model predicting whether and under what 
conditions mass privatizations are accompanied by asset stripping. In addition to directly testing the 
theory, we also tackle an important policy-oriented issue of why a large number of efficient firms 
disappeared during mass privatization in a booming economy of Montenegro. Econometrically, we 
present the first study to look at firms that disappeared during a mass privatization transition, 
improving upon prior studies that focused only on existing firms and assumed away survival bias. 
Our analysis suggests that asset stripping and firm disappearance were present, and that asset 
stripping was a likely reason for the loss of efficient firms. We show that because more productive 
firms were liquidated, it is important to model survival bias in the selection of firms remaining in 
samples when estimating the effects of privatization or other ownership changes. We also show that 
one needs to distinguish between true start-ups and liquidated firms that re-appear as start-ups. In the 
absence of the rule of law, many firms that appear to have disappeared were in fact appropriated by 
managers and politically connected individuals.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Privatization of state-owned firms has been a key feature of the transition from communism 
to capitalism, and from the outset the general expectation was that privatization would improve the 
performance of firms and thus also the transition economies. The early surveys of privatization in 
transition economies showed positive or mixed results.
1
 The most recent survey by Estrin, Hanousek, 
Kocenda, and Svejnar (2009) indicates, however, that while privatization to foreign owners has a 
positive effect on firm performance, privatization to domestic owners has a much less positive effect 
in Central and East Europe, and that the effect is on average zero or even negative in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A leading explanation for the limited or nonexistent 
positive performance effect of privatization to domestic owners is stripping of enterprise assets by 
managers.  
Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) develop the first model of asset stripping and identify conditions 
under which asset stripping may be observed. Yet, despite the importance of the Hoff-Stiglitz model, 
there has been no formal empirical test of its predictions. Campos and Giovannoni (2006) develop a 
second model of asset stripping and econometrically test their model’s predictions. Campos and 
Giovannoni (2006) are handicapped, however, in that they do not have information about state-
owned enterprises – i.e., about firms whose assets were presumably stripped. In the absence of this 
direct information, the authors infer the extent of asset stripping from an answer provided by general 
managers of new start-up firms. In particular, they use as their proxy for an asset stripping variable 
the answer that these managers provided to the question: “How much of your capital equipment 
came from state enterprises which helped found this firm?” This approach is ingenious but obviously 
rough. The key problem is that the capital equipment in question might or might not have been 
stripped from the state enterprises. Moreover, the question is excessively narrow because asset 
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 The earlier studies are reviewed for instance in Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murell (2002). They  
vary from finding no systematic performance effect (Bevan, Estrin, and Schaffer, 1999) to noting that a positive effect 
probably dominates (Megginson & Netter, 2001), to concluding that the overall effect is positive (Carlin, Fries, Schaffer, 
and Seabright, 2001; Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Shirley and Walsh, 2000). 
stripping includes items other than just equipment – e.g., profit, raw materials, and semi-finished and 
finished goods. The issue remains as to what extent this indirect measure reflects actual asset 
stripping. 
The state of the literature is therefore such that there is a relatively rough test of the Campos 
and Giovannoni theoretical model and, to the best of our knowledge, no formal test of the predictions 
of the Hoff-Stiglitz theoretical model.  
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by testing directly the two key predictions of the 
Hoff-Stiglitz model with respect to asset stripping, as well as addressing twin policy-oriented puzzle: 
the disappearance of a large number of originally state-owned firms during mass privatization, 
despite a rapidly growing economy. In our empirical analysis, we find support for the key predictions 
of the Hoff-Stiglitz asset stripping model, the hypothesis that asset stripping is the cause of the 
limited survival of these firms and that, counter to predictions from standard economic theory, more 
rather than less productive firms were liquidated. This finding points to the need to model the 
endogenous exit of firms when one estimates the effects of privatization of firm performance. Our 
results also indicate that one needs to distinguish between true start-ups and liquidated firms that re-
appear as de novo (start-up) firms. 
To carry out our analysis, we collected a unique dataset of all 225 firms in Montenegro that went 
through mass voucher privatization beginning in 2001.  A particularly interesting feature of our data 
set from the standpoint of possible asset stripping is that during this period Montenegro may be 
characterized as having had a weak rule of law and while the total number of firms in the country 
was growing, the total number of firms in our sample decreased markedly. Almost one-half of the 
225 firms going through privatization went bankrupt or were liquidated, often reappearing as private 
firms with influential managers or politically linked individuals as new owners.  
Given this background, our empirical strategy is to use data on the state-owned firms that 
went into mass privatization and infer the presence of asset stripping from the characteristics of the 
firms that survived versus those that did not. We are hence able to use a more direct approach than 
Campos and Giovannoni (2006). As we discuss below, our econometric estimates support the key 
predictions of the Hoff-Stiglitz model. In particular, firms that had assets and whose assets were 
easier to strip (firms that were more productive and smaller) were also the firms that were more 
likely to go bankrupt or be liquidated in the privatization period.
2
 We do not find support for two 
more ad hoc hypotheses advanced in the context of the Hoff-Stiglitz model, namely that more 
indebted firms were less likely to survive and firms with more long-term assets as a proportion of 
total assets were more likely to survive. We surmise that this is due to different institutional settings 
in Russia (which inspired the Hoff-Stiglitz model) and Montenegro. 
Econometrically, we are the first to look at firms that disappeared – because of data 
limitations, firm-level studies generally ignore the survival bias that may be quite serious. Our results 
show that more productive firms were liquidated, a finding that points to the need to model the 
selection of firms into the sample when one estimates the effects of ownership changes.
3
 Our results 
also indicate that one needs to distinguish between true start-ups and liquidated firms that re-appear 
as de novo (start-up) firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the relevant features of the 
institutional context. In Section 3 we outline the Hoff-Stiglitz model and derive the predictions and 
hypotheses used in our research. In Section 4 we discuss our data and empirical strategy. In Section 5 
we present our empirical results and in the last section we conclude. 
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 This phenomenon could be observed in many transition economies. However, the more decentralized characteristic of 
the Yugoslav economy before privatization gave managers more information about their firm and its environment, which 
they used in the process of privatization. Anecdotal evidence as well as rather limited literature on this issue (e.g., 
Gregurek (2001), Gregorič (2002), Cerović and Dragutinović Mitrović (2007), Koman and Hadži Vasileva – Markovska 
(2007), Koman et al. (2011)) thus suggest that the model of management appropriation was common in the countries of 
former Yugoslavia, including Macedonia, BIH, Croatia and Serbia.  The Slovenian situation was different in that the 
process of management buy-outs escalated only before the current crisis (see, for example, Prašnikar, Svejnar (2007), 
Domadenik et al. (2008) and Bole et al. (2012)). 
3
 This finding complements that of Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008), who show with Czech data that better performing 
firms were privatized first and ignoring this selection leads to biased estimates of the effects of privatization in existing 
studies. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Montenegro became a member state of Yugoslavia after World War I and joined the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito’s rule after World War II. Over the 45 years 
of its duration, the socialist Yugoslav economy was defined by social ownership of property, 
resulting in the widespread perception that property was owned by all citizens (Prašnikar and 
Prašnikar, 1986). Moreover, a complicated market-based planning mechanism with worker 
participation in management gradually determined resource allocation and income distribution 
(Prašnikar and Svejnar, 1991), leading to widespread perception that official rules did not have to be 
fully respected.  
Interestingly, Montenegro introduced different models of privatization before the main 
process – known as mass voucher privatization – started in 2001.
4
 A striking characteristic was that 
each privatization attempt resulted in the failure of a large number of firms. In June 2001, all citizens 
over the age of 18 received vouchers and 225 Montenegrin public and private limited companies 
were included in the mass voucher privatization plan. As in Russia’s Big Bang privatization, which 
occured in the absence of the rule of law, the initial conditions in Montenegro contributed to low 
transparency of the privatization process and weak investor protection. Indeed, both the Bankruptcy 
Law of 2002 and the legal system as a whole permitted property manipulation. In the presence of 
slow institutional transformation, enthusiasm in the early 2000s to build an open market economy 
permitted asset stripping, as well as the rapid concentration of ownership of many firms by few 
influential individuals.  
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 The start of the privatization process in Montenegro was connected with 1989 Yugoslav legislation called the Federal 
Legal Act of Social Capital, which was based on an internal privatization model that emphasized social ownership 
transfer to companies’ employees. In the beginning of 1990, Yugoslavia collapsed and this law did not have a significant 
influence on the ownership transformation process in Montenegro. The first privatization legislation in Montenegro was 
introduced in 1992, and its main goal was to estimate the value of company capital and define the privatization method. 
The result was a transfer of social ownership to state funds (60 percent of companies’ ownership) and employees (40 
percent of companies’ shares). The next milestone in the Montenegrin privatization process was in 1996 when new 
legislation, the Privatization Law of 1996, was introduced. The main emphasis of this Law was on the privatization of the 
direct and indirect ownership by the state and the introduction of the idea of mass voucher privatization. Construction of 
the legal framework for the privatization process was continued in 1999 when Amendments to the Privatization Law 
were adopted and the mass voucher privatization plan was introduced (Vukotić, 2001). 
 The tourist company Ski-centar Durmitor, once one of the flagship companies in Montenegro, 
provides an illustrative example. Due to mass voucher privatization, its workers received 26.96% 
ownership of the firm and investors, using their privatization vouchers, bought the rest. The former 
manager leased a substantial part of the company’s property (hotel, ski lifts, restaurants, and shops) 
to his own, newly formed company, called New Ski-centar Durmitor, and later filed for bankruptcy 
protection for the old firm. In the following years, the bankruptcy receiver sold the old company’s 
remaining property (land and buildings) to private investors at extremely low prices. Recently, the 
New Ski-centar Durmitor also declared liquidation due to its high indebtedness and most of the 
property was sold to a newly formed company, again owned by the former manager.
5
  
Because of the lack of transparency and state control during the privatization process, 90 
percent of adult Montenegro citizens characterized the process as “badly managed.”  They expressed 
dissatisfaction with the role of government, parliament and trade unions in the privatization process. 
Only the media were perceived to have played a positive role by reporting the manipulations that 
were taking place in the privatization process (Karadžić and Jovović, 2008).  
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we combine the essence of the institutional setting described above with the 
Hoff-Stiglitz theoretical model to obtain testable predictions about asset stripping. Hoff and Stiglitz 
(2004) develop a static model of asset stripping and the demand for the rule of law, basing it on 
Russia’s experience with “Big Bang” privatization of state-owned enterprises (that was similarly 
accompanied by significant asset stripping in the absence of rule of law). Their model economy 
consists of agents who have control rights over enterprises. Each agent chooses between two actions 
to maximize the expected value of his wealth: 1) strip the assets of the enterprise and appropriate the 
value; 2) build enterprise value by making an irreversible investment to increase the value of the 
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 See, Žabljački oriđinali uništili turizam, Vijesti, February 4, 2011, (pp.6) for a detail description of this case. 
enterprise.  Agents who strip assets actively hamper (or are indifferent to) the establishment of the 
rule of law because it may reduce their ability to strip. In contrast, agents who build value demand 
the rule of law because it permits agents to conclude enforceable contracts. 
The model permits one to derive testable predictions. Let x be the fraction of agents in the 
economy who oppose the establishment of the rule of law and 1-x denote the constituency for the 
rule of law. Note that this implies the probability of establishing the rule of law is a decreasing 
function of x. Agents differ in their abilities to strip enterprise assets versus create enterprise value. 
An agent’s type with respect to this ability is represented by θ, where agents with a higher value of θ 
strip assets better, but are less productive in investing.  
The model may be characterized by the two curves depicted in Figure 1: 1) the switch line 
and 2) the stripping ability curve. The switch line is downward sloping and gives combinations of x 
and θ for which the agents are indifferent between building value and stripping assets. Combinations 
of x and θ below the lines reflect agent types that build value, while those above the line reflect 
agents that strip assets. Thus, any factor that shifts the switch line downward will result in a higher 
probability of asset stripping. In the Montenegrin context, for example, widespread pessimism about 
the emergence of the rule of law at the beginning of mass voucher privatization presumably shifted 
the switch line down. 
The stripping ability curve gives, for each value of θ, the fraction of agents whose ability is 
greater than or equal to that value. If the factors that determine the ability to strip assets and build 
value are normally distributed in the population of agents, the stripping ability curve will tend to 
have the S-shape depicted in Figure 1.  
Equilibria occur at the intersection of the two curves. As may be seen from Figure 1, multiple 
equilibria are possible, with stable equilibria being given by the intersections where the slope of the 
stripping ability curve is steeper than that of the switch line (x* in Figure 1). Because the probability 
of establishing the rule of law is a decreasing function of x, equilibria further to the right yield a 
smaller probability of establishing the rule of law, and hence a higher probability of asset stripping 
(and lower probability of building enterprise value). As may be seen from Figure 1, factors that shift 
the stripping ability curve upward result in a higher probability of asset stripping (higher value of x) 
at a stable equilibrium. Moreover, a large enough upward shift may eliminate the presence of a good 
equilibrium altogether, resulting in greater asset stripping. Note, a downward shift in the switch line 
will have a similar effect to an upward shift in the stripping ability curve (a higher probability of 
asset stripping). 
 
  Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
We combine the essence of the institutional setting described previously with the Hoff-
Stiglitz theoretical model to obtain two ceteris paribus predictions about asset stripping: 
Prediction 1: Firms that were more efficient before mass voucher privatization were more 
likely to be subject to asset stripping and hence more likely to go bankrupt or be liquidated. 
 
Prediction 1 reflects the fact that managers and politically connected individuals possessed 
better information about firm value than others and in the weak legal system they focused on 
stripping assets (appropriating value) of valuable firms during mass privatization.
6
 It is to be noted 
that Prediction 1 stands in contrast to the prediction from the standard economic theory, which would 
suggest that more efficient firms are more likely than others to survive because of their greater ability 
to compete.  
Prediction 2: Firms that were larger before mass voucher privatization were less likely to be 
subject to asset stripping and hence more likely to survive. 
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 See also, Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008) for description of the cherry pick effect in the context of timing of 
privatization.  
Prediction 2 reflects the assumption that even in an imperfect legal setting it is harder to strip 
assets of large (visible) firms. The Montenegrin institutional setting was conducive to this behavior. 
Before voucher privatization, bank loans were administratively rationed to large state-owned 
companies. Subsequently, these firms were more closely monitored by banks and state authorities 
(see Table 1 for leverage by firm ownership and size). 
In addition to the predictions that are derived from their theoretical model, Hoff and Stiglitz 
also offer two relatively ad hoc hypotheses about factors that might increase managers’ ability to 
strip assets. In the Montenegrin context, they may be expressed as: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that were more indebted (leveraged and mortgaged) before mass 
voucher privatization were less likely to survive. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with more long-term assets as a proportion of total assets before mass 




 In stating the two hypotheses, Hoff and Stiglitz draw on the institutional setting of Russia’s 
privatization, as well as the intuitive notion that asset stripping would increase in situations where the 
firm is more liquid, all else equal. 
 Note that the factors mentioned in Predictions 1 and 2, as well as Hypotheses 1 and 2, are 
likely to increase an agent’s ability to strip and thus shift up the stripping ability curve. A large 
enough upward shift can of course eliminate the “good equilibrium.” 
 
3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
As mentioned above, mass voucher privatization took place in Montenegro in June, 2001 
when all citizens over the age of 18 received vouchers and 225 Montenegrin public and private 
limited companies were included in the mass voucher privatization plan. Before the process started, 
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 In particular, the more easily the commodities requiring little processing can be extracted from the assets, more likely is 
the stripping of resources.  
 
the principal owners of the 225 companies were state funds and employees. In particular, three state 
funds (Development Fund, Pension Fund, and Employment Fund) had on average a 55 percent 
ownership stake, while employees had on average 27.6 percent. Direct state ownership was low at 
4.4 percent, the representation of private investors was only 10 percent, and other owners held on 
average 3 percent (Vukotić, 2001).
8
 
For all the 225 firms that participated in the 2001 mass voucher privatization we obtained 
accounting data from income statements and balance sheets, as well as data on the ownership 
structure, for the pre-mass privatization period 1998-2000.
 9
 Together with information from the 
Register of Legal Entities in Montenegro from year 2008, we are able to determine which of the 225 
firms that entered mass voucher privatization plan survived until 2008 (survivors) and which did not 
(non-survivors). We use these 2008 data on survivorship and the 1998-2000 firm-level data on 
revenues, long–term assets, debt/assets ratio, leverage, employment, ownership structure, estimated 
TFP, and mortgages to test the Hoff-Stiglitz predictions and hypotheses.  
We present descriptive statistics in Table 1, which shows the characteristics of firms that did 
not survive mass voucher privatization in comparison to those that did survive. Firms that did not 
survive were on average smaller in terms of revenues, number of employees, value of assets, and 
fixed capital compared to firms that survived, and the differences are statistically significant. The 
TFP estimate shows that firms that did not survive were on average significantly more productive 
than firms that survived.
10
  On the other hand, there were no statistically significant differences 
among the survivors and non-survivors in their average leverage or possession of a mortgage. The 
long term assets/total assets ratio was significantly higher in firms that survived than those that did 
not survive, and the share of state ownership (direct and direct plus indirect) was higher in survivor 
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 Mass voucher privatization ended in 2002. Thirty-seven enterprises out of 227 were fully privatized using this method, 
135 were more than 90% privatized, and 33 were more than 70% privatized. In 19 large-sized companies the government 
retained a controlling share The government also prepared a number of large-sized companies for sale to the highest 
bidder (a strategic investor) by selling either assets or equity shares on tenders. (Ekonomski fakultet Podgorica, 2011). 
9
 The source for this data was publication of Privatization Council of Montenegro (Savjet za privatizacijo, 2001). 
10
 The TFP measure is based on the error component in a panel fixed effect estimation.  
than non-survivor firms.  These statistics are suggestive of the type of endogenous exit implied by 
Predictions 1 and 2 and Hypothesis 2. However, the expectation of higher leverage and/or presence 
of mortgage in non-surviving firms (Hypothesis 1) is not supported by the average values in Table 1.   
 
  Insert Table 1 in about here 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES 
In order to test the predictions and hypotheses about asset stripping, we use the probit model. The 
model we estimate is: 
  Pr(Survivorit = 1) = ϕ[αo+ α1∙TFPit + α2∙lnSizeit + α3∙Ownershipit + α4∙Mortgagei +      
         α5∙Leverageit + α6∙(Long-term Assetsit  / Assetsit)]      (1) 
where ϕ is the cumulative normal distribution. The probability of the firm surviving to 2008 depends 
on the firm’s TFP in 1998, 1999 or 2000 (discussed below), logarithm of size (measured by the 
number of employees in 1998), 1998 ownership structure (given by the percentage of shares owned 
by the state, private investors, workers, and others), debt in 1998 (measured by a mortgage dummy 
variable and leverage, defined as debt/(debt + equity)), and 1998 long term assets/total assets ratio. 
To obtain an estimate of TFP we follow the mainstream literature and assume that a firm’s value 
added (Y) may be expressed as a Cobb-Douglas function of labor (L) and capital (K): 
Yit =A it Lit
δ
 Kit
γ                 
(2) 
where A it is the TFP of a firm i at time t, calculated as the residual of the estimated production 
function. We obtain the TFP estimate using a fixed effect (FE) estimator on the annual firm-level 
observations in 1998-2000, which provides unbiased estimates of absolute TFP levels under the 
assumption that productivity is close to fixed over that time period. It is worthwhile to note that we 
are only interested in comparing relative TFP levels across differentially surviving firms, not 
absolute TFP levels. 
 
  Insert Table 2 in about here 
 
 The estimates of the probit model are presented in Table 2. The estimated coefficients in the 
three columns are based on TFP estimates of individual firms, calculated from the 1998-2000 
regression as the firm-specific residuals for 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively. The values of all 
other variables correspond to 1998.  
      As may be seen from Table 2, at the 10% (two-tail) test significance level, the estimates of 
the probit model support Prediction 1. In particular, the more productive the firm was before 
privatization in 1998-2000, the less likely it was to survive into 2008. Moreover, at the 1% test level 
the estimates in Table 2 support Prediction 2 that larger firms (measured by number of employees in 
1998) were more likely to survive into 2008.   
On the other hand, the relatively ad hoc Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported by our estimates in 
Table 2. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the presence of mortgaged property and greater leverage do not 
have the expected negative effect on survival. In fact, when we use the 2000 TFP estimates (Table 2, 
column 3), the more leveraged firms are more likely to have survived, perhaps because more 
leveraged firms were more closely monitored by lenders. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the ratio of long-
term assets to total assets does not have a statistically significant effect on the survival of firms into 
2008. We conjecture that the lack of support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 is due to different institutional 
settings in Russia (which inspired the Hoff-Stiglitz model) and Montenegro.
11
 
In sum, the estimates in Table 2 together with the descriptive statistics in Table 1 support the 
predictions from the Hoff-Stiglitz theoretical model that managers and politically connected 
individuals in Montenegro were inclined to strip assets, rather than build value, and that they were 
more likely to do in smaller (less visible) than larger firms. 
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In this paper, we address a twin theoretical and policy-oriented issue. The theoretical issue is 
whether and under what conditions mass privatizations are accompanied by asset stripping and, 
hence, low demand for rule of law. The policy-oriented issue is why a large number of firms 
disappeared during mass privatization in a rapidly growing economy of Montenegro. Our empirical 
analysis suggests asset stripping and firm disappearance phenomena were present and related to one 
another. Moreover, they are consistent with the key predictions of the Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) 
model. 
 In interpreting our findings, it is important to note that Montenegro was praised for its progress 
in privatization during the 1997-2007 period. The value of the sum of the two European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indicators for privatization (small plus large firms) 
increased from 2 in 1998 to 7 in 2005 (the maximum possible value for both being 8.67).
12
 In this 
period, Montenegro also substantially increased its growth. The average growth rate of GDP in 2001-
2008 was 5 percent, a relatively good performance among the economies in the region. The question 
that consequently arises is how this positive performance assessment can be reconciled with the fact 
that so many firms were lost during voucher privatization. 
Our analysis shows that asset stripping is a plausible reason for this loss of firms in a boom time. 
In reality, many firms did not disappear, but in the absence of the rule of law they were appropriated 
by managers and politically connected individuals who switched the firms to different legal and 
organizational forms.  
Econometrically, we are the first to look at firms that disappeared in the context of mass 
privatization, as prior studies of privatization of firms generally ignore survival bias. Our results 
show that more productive firms were liquidated. Prior studies of the performance effects of 
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ownership changes during privatization transitions disregard the endogenous exit of higher 
productivity firms, thus their estimates may suffer from bias. Our finding complements that of 
Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008), who show with Czech data that better performing firms were 
privatized first and that ignoring this selection leads to biased estimates of the effects of 
privatization. While Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008) show that surviving state-owned firms tend to 
be worse performers because the better performing firms are privatized first, our complementary 
results indicate that surviving firms tend to be less productive because the more productive ones 
disappear on account of asset stripping. 
Our results also indicate that one needs to distinguish between true start-ups and liquidated firms 
that re-appear as de novo (start-up) firms. In particular, one has to be cautious in drawing conclusions 
about the relative merit of “greenfield and brownfield” investments when the brownfield investments 
may underperform as a result of asset stripping of the more productive state-owned firms. 
An important area for future research concerns the effects of asset stripping in the context of the 
privatization process on subsequent performance of firms and the economy as a whole. Montenegro 
for instance mirrored other economies in the region in experiencing solid economic growth in the 
early-to-mid 2000s, followed by a recession in the late 2000s.
13
 A detailed analysis of recent micro 
data is needed to assess if asset stripping has had negative consequences on subsequent efficiency 
and growth. 
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 However, some indicators signaled problems early on. For instance, between 2005 and 2009 the unit labor cost in 
Montenegro rose by 21.7% relative to that of Austria, while Croatia’s and Serbia’s unit labor cost (relative to Austria) 
rose merely 1.8% and 3.1%, respectively (WIIW, 2010). With this loss of competitive advantage, many Montenegrin 
firms were hard hit by the global economic recession. Indeed, by some indicators (e.g., budget and current account 
deficits) recent economic performance may be inferior to that of other economies in the region. 
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Figure 1: Dual Stable Equilibrium in the Hoff-Stiglitz Model 
 
 
Source: Hoff and Stiglitz (2004).  
  
Table 1: 1998-2000 Descriptive Statistics for Firms Participating in Mass Voucher 
Privatization in year 2001  





VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD t-test sig
 Montly net wage 100.47 93.95 157.69 122.99 -6.47 ***
Alternative monthly net wage 97.25 50.15 114.11 67.92 -3.71 ***
Number of Employees 81.5 112.49 332.07 636.41 -7.32 ***
Labor cost 174282.2 267839 1841335 5190885.5 -5.99 ***
Revenues from selling goods and services 726342.9 1588774 10065847 33585957 -5.19 ***
Share of  revenues in domestic market 0.93 0.64 0.93 0.55 -0.13
Profit -154986 438283.3 -3262986 23440547 2.48 **
Leverage= Debt /(Debt + Equity) 0.16 0.2 0.17 0.19 -0.29
Long term assets / Assets 0.75 0.23 0.83 0.69 -3.14 ***
Debt (long and short term) 1116186 2123548 14801226 81338369 -1.99 **
Assets 6035804 10677622 49892351 128432679 -6.37 **
Long term assets 4810350 8667985 38707836 109526397 -5.76 ***
Fixed capital 4046879 8327085 29327437 86948565 -5.39 ***
Productivity measure
+
1.45 2.76 1.12 0.66 2.12 **
NON SURVIVERS SUVIVERS mean-comparison 
Ownership
State (direct) (%) 1.45 7.98 6.22 18.84 -4.45 ***
Private owners (%)P 11.12 23.03 8.94 19.6 1.3
State (direct + indirect) (%) 56.73 1.38 61.64 1.14 -2.73 ***
Workers (%) 28.49 0.54 27.17 0.51 1.77 *
Mortgage (share of companies) 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 -0.28
REMARKS:
SD is standard deviation.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 + The productivity measure is total factor productivity estimated via a fixed effects estimator as described in the text.
Source: Savjet za privatizaciju (2001)  and own calculations.
 
All variables are in 2007 euro.
Table 2: Estimates of the Survival Probit Model for Firms Participating in Mass 
Voucher Privatization   
(The estimated coefficients in the three columns are based on TFP estimates of individual firms, calculated 


















coef. -0.466 -0.154 -0.41 -0.138 -0.362 -0.121
st.er. 0.260* 0.084* 0.238* 0.078* 0.214* 0.07*
coef. -0.293 -0.097 -0.283 -0.095 -0.282 -0.094
st.er. 0.255 0.083 0.244 0.081 0.231 0.076
coef. 0.96 0.318 0.488 0.164 1.392 0.467
st.er. 1.082 0.355 0.928 0.311 0.841* 0.276*
coef. 1.017 0.337 0.515 0.173 1.238 0.415
st.er. 0.944 0.309 0.832 0.279 0.788 0.259
coef. 0.002 0.0008 0.003 0.0009 0.003 0.0009
st.er. 0.001*** 0.0002*** 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.0003***
coef. 0.011 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.002
st.er. 0.012 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.011 0.004
coef. 0.01 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002
st.er. 0.012 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.011 0.004
coef. -0.001 -0.0002 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.0003
st.er. 0.015 0.005 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.005
coef.  /  /  /  /  /  /
st.er.  /  /  /  /  /  /
coef. 0.066 0.219 0.138 0.047 0.654 0.207
st.er. 0.672 0.222 0.67 0.224 0.548 0.155
coef. -0.135 -0.045 -0.358 -0.120 -0.053 -0.012
st.er. 0.477 0.159 0.479 0.157 0.449 0.153
coef. -0.187 -0.063 -0.087 -0.029 0.007 0.002
st.er. 0.404 0.135 0.403 0.137 0.388 0.131
coef. 0.431 0.137 0.376 0.124 0.354 0.117
st.er. 0.295 0.091 0.271 0.087 0.262 0.085
coef. 0.093 0.031 0.151 0.051 0.13 0.044
st.er. 0.326 0.108 0.318 0.107 0.314 0.106
coef. 0.036 0.012 0.09 0.03 0.001 0.0003
st.er. 0.383 0.127 0.377 0.127 0.35 0.119
coef. -1.228  / -0.752  / -1.341  /
st.er. 1.422  / 1.405  / 1.31  /
181 181 196 196 206 206
REMARKS:
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 + The productivity measure is total factor productivity estimated via a fixed effects estimator as described in the text.
++
 Among industry dummies Manufacturing is used as a base (i.e. expressed In a constant term).
 +++ dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
 ++++ Among ownership variablables, share of other ownership is used as a base.
Source: Savjet za privatizaciju (2001) and own calculations.
Industry dummy: Trade
Industry dummy: Tourism and Restaurants








Industry dummy: Agriculture and Forestry
Industry dummy: Construction




Long term assets / Assets
Number of workers
Ownership: State (all)++++
